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COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY—A LEGAL 
OBLIGATION TO DETER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE IN THE MILITARY 
LINDSAY HOYLE* 
Abstract: The United States should adopt the international doctrine of com-
mand responsibility within the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) as a 
solution to widespread reports of intra-military rape and sexual assault. Apply-
ing command responsibility to serious violations of the UCMJ, like rape, 
would establish a clear mandate for the military to prosecute any commander 
who fails to reasonably prevent, investigate, or punish serious UCMJ viola-
tions that he or she knew about, either via constructive or actual knowledge. 
Congress should limit the doctrine’s scope to serious UCMJ violations that 
commanders are aware of and recklessly choose to ignore in order to prevent 
significant, rather than trivial harms. Although the Department of Defense re-
cently articulated a duty to prosecute intra-military rape and sexual assault, es-
tablishing a duty achieves nothing without proper enforcement—command re-
sponsibility is one solution. 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 24, 2013, U. S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced 
that the U.S. military would henceforth officially include women in combat 
positions.1 This announcement followed the January 23rd hearing before the 
House Armed Services Committee concerning widespread reports of rape 
and sexual assault at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas.2 Reports like these 
                                                                                                                           
 * Lindsay Hoyle is an Executive Articles Editor for the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. 
 1 See Memorandum from Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, & Leon E. 
Panetta, Sec’y of Def., to Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts Acting Under Sec’y of Def. for Personnel and 
Readiness Chiefs of the Military Servs. (Jan. 24, 2013) (on file with Dep’t of Def.); Jim Mi-
klaszewski & Courtney Kube, Defense Chief Panetta to Clear Women for Combat Roles, NBC 
NEWS (Jan. 23, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/01/23/16664507-defense-chief-
panetta-to-clear-women-for-combat-roles?lite (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
 2 Michelle Bernard, With Women in Combat, Will Military Finally Address Epidemic of Sexual 
Assault?, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/
2013/01/24/with-woman-in-combat-will-military-finally-address-epidemic-of-sexual-assault/ (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2014); House Armed Services Committee Hold Congressional Hearing on Lakeland 
Sex Abuse Investigation, SERVICE WOMEN’S ACTION NETWORK (Jan. 23, 2013), 
http://yubanet.com/usa/House-Armed-Services-Committee-Hold-Congressional-Hearing-on-
Lakeland-Sex-Abuse-Investigation_printer.php (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
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underscore the urgent need to critically assess the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice’s (UCMJ) capability to combat intra-military sexual violence in both 
the military and military academies.3 
During the 2010 fiscal year alone, the military services received 2617 
reports of sexual assault.4 The significance of this figure is magnified by the 
high underreporting rates of sexual assault, both within the military and ci-
vilian life.5 The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that a mere 14 
percent of service members who experience unwanted sexual conduct re-
port these incidents to military authorities.6 Consequently, the realistic 
number of sexual assaults perpetrated against military members in 2010 was 
probably closer to 19,000—a staggering figure that reflects harm not only to 
the victims, but also to the military.7 
In the 2010 Annual Report of Sexual Assault in the Military, the DOD 
acknowledged that rape and sexual assault impair the military’s readiness 
and impede mission accomplishment.8 Intra-military sexual violence reduc-
es individual potential, and it upsets unit cohesion by breaking apart the 
important bond of trust and confidence needed for service members to risk 
their lives for one another.9 Moreover, the military’s failure to redress seri-
ous crimes like rape and sexual assault incurs high financial costs stemming 
from the need to treat assault victims’ resultant physical and mental health 
problems, and it leads to civil suits challenging the military’s inadequate 
responses.10 Commanders’ failure to investigate and punish rape creates 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE OFFICE (SAPRO), DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY, FISCAL 2011 2 (2012) [here-
inafter 2011 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.sapr.mil/media/pdf/reports/; Complaint 
for Plaintiffs, ¶¶ 179–180, Cioca v. Rumsfeld, No. 11-cv-00151, 2011 WL 4500606 (E.D. Va. 
2011) [hereinafter Cioca Complaint]; Megan N. Schmid, Comment, Combatting a Different Ene-
my: Proposals to Change the Culture of Sexual Assault in the Military, 55 VILL. L. REV. 475, 
487–90 (2010); Bernard, supra note 2. 
 4 See 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 28. 
 5 See id. 
 6 See id.; Cioca Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 181. 
 7 SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE OFFICE (SAPRO), DEPARTMENT OF DE-
FENSE ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY, FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 97 
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.sapr.mil/index.php/annual-
reports. These figures were recorded during the fiscal year 2010, which spans October 1, 2009, 
through September 30, 2010. Id. at 1. 
 8 See id. at C-1, C-3. 
 9 See, e.g., Cioca Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 181. 
 10 See 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 67; SERVICE WOMEN’S ACTION NETWORK, 
RAPE, SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE MILITARY 1–2 (2012). See generally 
Cioca Complaint, supra note 3. “The VA spends approximately $10,880 on healthcare costs per 
military sexual assault survivor.” Briefing Paper: Department of Defense (DOD) Annual Report 
on Sexual Assault in the Mlitary [sic], Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, SERVICE WOMEN’S ACTION NET-
WORK (2012), [hereinafter Briefing Paper] http://servicewomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/
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distrust and concern that unit commanders will ignore their duties to inves-
tigate and prosecute UCMJ violations, thereby disrupting the order and dis-
cipline central to the military’s successful operation.11 Furthermore, com-
manders’ failure to hold perpetrators accountable excuses non-compliance 
with the UCMJ and law of war.12 
Although the DOD proclaims a zero tolerance policy against sexual 
assault, it has failed to effectively prevent, or arguably even reduce, the per-
petration of these egregious harms.13 Rather, the military continues to turn a 
blind eye to numerous reports of sexual assault each year.14 For instance, 
although the DOD recorded 3192 reports of sexual assault in 2011, it sent 
only 489 suspects to courts-martial, of which only 240 actually proceeded 
to trial.15 This catch and release of suspects was due in part to unit com-
manders’ unfettered discretion to deny further investigation, dismiss charg-
es, seek minor administrative action, or elect to pursue non-judicial pun-
ishment that amounts to a slap on the wrist.16 Further, many victims de-
scribe a hyper-masculine, misogynistic military culture that trivializes and 
discredits allegations of sexual assault, thereby permitting superiors and 
peers alike to ignore these reports, or worse, to retaliate against the victims 
rather than the perpetrators.17 
                                                                                                                           
SAPRO-briefing-report-4_17_12.pdf (noting that low-level command discretion halts 68 percent 
of actionable cases from proceeding to courts-martial). 
 11 See DEP’T OF DEF., TASK FORCE REPORT ON CARE FOR VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 5 
(Apr. 2004); Victor Hansen, What’s Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander Lessons from 
Abu Ghraib: Time for the United States to Adopt a Standard of Command Responsibility Towards 
Its Own, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 398 (2007). 
 12 See Hansen, supra note 11, at 398–99; Amy J. Sepinwall, Failures to Punish: Command 
Responsibility in Domestic and International Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 251, 299 (2009) (explain-
ing how failing to punish subordinates’ atrocities signals that violations are permitted, leading to 
future atrocities). 
 13 See 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 1; Elizabeth L. Hillman, Front and Center: 
Sexual Violence in the Military, 37 POL. & SOC’Y 101, 113 (2009) (describing how current reform 
measures fail to adequately deter intra-military sexual violence). 
 14 See 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 45; Hillman, supra note 13, at 113. 
 15 See 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 45. 
 16 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2012) [hereinafter MCM], availa-
ble at http://www.uscg.mil/legal/mj/MJ_Doc/mcm2012.pdf; Schmid, supra note 3, at 489–90. The 
MCM is an executive order that dictates the conduct of the courts-martial process within the Unit-
ed States, including the sources of jurisdiction, rules for courts-martial, elements and punishments 
of offenses, and guidelines for the imposition of non-judicial punishments. MCM, supra, Preface 
1, pmbl., I-1. 
 17 See, e.g., Cioca Complaint, supra note 3, ¶¶ 3, 26 (describing how commanders retaliated 
against victims for reporting sexual assaults); Schmid, supra note 3, at 490; Valorie Vojdik, Wom-
en and War: A Critical Discourse: Panel Two-Women Warriors, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & 
JUST. 338, 346 (2005) (“[T]he hyper-masculine culture within the military that not only defines 
warriors as male and masculine, but that denigrates women and celebrates symbolically sexualized 
violence against women.”). 
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This Note proposes that Congress assimilate the customary interna-
tional law doctrine of command responsibility within the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice as a solution to the widespread incidents of rape and sexual 
assault in the military.18 Command responsibility holds commanders crimi-
nally responsible for war crimes committed by their subordinates when they 
knew or should have known of such atrocities and failed to reasonably pre-
vent or punish their occurrence.19 
Part I of this Note provides a synopsis of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice in the United States and its role in responding to reports of rape and 
sexual assault. This section also highlights other countries’ solutions to in-
tra-military sexual violence. Part II details the development of command 
responsibility, both within the United States and internationally, and analyz-
es several existing provisions of the UCMJ that support incorporation of the 
command responsibility doctrine. Part III advocates the adoption of com-
mand responsibility within the UCMJ and discusses the appropriate stand-
ards of actus reus, mens rea, and punishment in the context of sexual as-
sault. Additionally, this section suggests that command responsibility would 
effectively combat sexual assault in the military. This Note concludes that 
applying command responsibility to violations of the UCMJ should signifi-
cantly reduce sexual assaults in the military, primarily by eradicating any 
undercurrents of sexism and misogyny that pervade the military. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The DOD’s Manual for Courts-Martial states, “[t]he purpose of mili-
tary law is to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and disci-
pline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the 
military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the 
United States.”20 Sexual assault and rape in the military contravene this ob-
jective by undermining mission accomplishment.21 Reports of rape and sex-
ual assault in the military are nonetheless widespread—from the infamous 
Tailhook scandal in 1991, where dozens of female service members were 
                                                                                                                           
 18 Cf. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. Ch. 47 (2012) [hereinafter 
UCMJ]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 28, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Rome Statute] (establishing a traditional doctrine of command responsibility); 2011 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 28 (indicating the prevalent reports of rape and sexual assault 
in the military); Hansen, supra note 11, at 414 (proposing that the military adopt command re-
sponsibility within the UCMJ under a revised Article 92 in order to deter abuses like those com-
mitted at Abu Ghraib). 
 19 Cf. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 28; Thomas O’Reilly, Command Responsibility: A 
Call to Realign Doctrine with Principles, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 71, 74 (2004). 
 20 See MCM, supra note 16, pmbl., I-1. 
 21 See 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 67. 
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sexually assaulted by fellow Navy personnel at an annual convention, to the 
more recent class action suit, Cioca et al. v. Rumsfeld et al., brought by sev-
eral service members against the DOD in 2011.22 
In Cioca, sixteen service members argued that the defendants, Secre-
taries of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates, failed to: 1) investi-
gate reported rapes and sexual assaults; 2) prosecute the offenders; 3) afford 
an acceptable judicial response as dictated by the UCMJ; and 4) implement 
necessary military reforms to combat rape and sexual assault as required by 
Congress.23 The suit addressed how command discretion is sometimes used 
to halt the investigation and prosecution of reported rapes, even where re-
ports indicate a need for further investigation or courts-martial.24 
Consider, for example, former Coast Guard Seaman (SN) Kori Cioca’s 
complaint contained within the suit.25 SN Cioca reported sexual harassment 
by her superior officer, but Coast Guard Command refused her request for 
transfer, and pleas for help.26 Her superior officer subsequently assaulted 
her again, allegedly in retaliation for reporting the harassment, and later 
forcibly raped her.27 In response, Command sentenced the perpetrator to 
minimal, non-judicial punishment for the attack, executing a small pay cut 
and restricting him to base for thirty days.28 In contrast, SN Cioca was 
threatened with court-martial if she filed formal rape charges even though 
she suffered from severe post-traumatic stress disorder, major depression, 
facial nerve damage, and bilateral disk displacement.29 Furthermore, service 
members like Cioca who were undeniably wronged, are barred from seek-
                                                                                                                           
 22 See generally Cioca Complaint, supra note 3; Schmid, supra note 3, at 480 (describing the 
various military sex scandals that permeate the news); Valorie K. Vojdik, Beyond Stereotyping in 
Equal Protection Doctrine: Reframing the Exclusion of Women from Combat, 57 ALA. L. REV. 
303, 347 (2005) (describing the sexual assaults of service members at the Tailhook Convention). 
 23 Cioca Complaint, supra note 3, at ¶ 2. 
 24 See id. ¶¶ 3, 158; Briefing Paper, supra note 10 (noting that low-level command discretion 
halts 68 percent of actionable cases from proceeding to courts-martial). 
 25 See Cioca Complaint, supra note 3, ¶¶ 7–28. 
 26 See id. ¶ 13. 
 27 See id. ¶¶ 17–22. According to her complaint, SN Cioca’s superior officer repeatedly as-
saulted and sexually harassed her. Id. She reported these initial incidents to Command, but Com-
mand denied her request for transfer. Id. ¶ 13. In November 2005, the superior sexually assaulted 
her. Id. ¶ 17. She similarly reported the incident to Command, but no action was taken, and Com-
mand informed her superior of the report. Id. ¶ 13. The superior subsequently threatened to stab 
SN Cioca. Id. ¶ 14. In December 2005, the superior assaulted and raped SN Cioca. Id. ¶ 20. When 
she reported this to Command, she was told to wait and subsequently threatened with court-
martial for lying if she pressed forward with the rape report. Id. ¶¶ 21–22. 
 28 See id. ¶ 23. 
 29 See id. ¶¶ 22, 28. 
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ing civil damages for their pain and suffering because courts deem rape a 
risk inherent in military service under the Feres doctrine.30 
Although the DOD has adopted reforms, such as creating the Sexual 
Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO), and ordering mandatory 
reporting of sexual assault to higher commanders, reports of sexual assault 
continue unabated.31 Military service members seeking to file or prosecute 
claims of sexual assault are bound by the UCMJ’s provisions, which define 
the act of sexual assault, and the available sanctions.32 Therefore, an analy-
sis of the UCMJ is critical to understanding the unique avenues through 
which criminal acts, like rape, are addressed within the military.33 
A. General Overview of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
The Uniform Code of Military Justice, established in 1951, is the crim-
inal penal code for military service members.34 The UCMJ proscribes juris-
diction, determines the court-martial process, and establishes criminal of-
                                                                                                                           
 30 See Feres v. U.S., 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (“[T]he Government is not liable under the 
[FTCA] for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity 
incident to service.”); Order, Judge Liam O’Grady, Cioca, 2011 WL 4500606 [hereinafter Cioca 
Order] (dismissing the complaint as a military discipline matter and for reasons stated in open 
court); Jesse Ellison, Judge Dismisses ‘Epidemic’ of Rape in Military Case, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 
13, 2011), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/13/judge-dismisses-epidemic-of-rape-in-
military-case.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (describing how the defense argued that the alleged 
harms were incident to her military service); see also Gonzalez v. U.S. Air Force, 88 Fed. Appx. 
371, 375–77 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that Feres barred plaintiff’s negligence suit against the Air 
Force because her attendance and intoxication were a direct consequence of her military status, 
leading to the sexual assault); Corey v. U.S., No. 96-6409, 1997 WL 474521, *1, *3–5 (10th Cir. 
1997) (holding that Feres barred plaintiff’s suit against the Air Force because her attendance at the 
on-base party where she was sexually assaulted was a consequence of her military status). 
 31 See 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 2 (showing high reports of sexual assault in the 
military); Schmid, supra note 3, at 481 (discussing the creation of SAPRO to combat sexual as-
sault in the military); Lisa Daniel, Panetta, Dempsey Announce Initiatives to Stop Sexual Assault, 
AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=
67954 (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
 32 See generally UCMJ arts. 2 (Persons subject to this chapter), 120 (Rape and sexual assault 
generally); DEP’T OF DEF., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES (2008) art. 120 (listing 
the available sanctions for rape, sexual assault, and other sexual misconduct, ranging from death 
or lengthy confinement to dishonorable discharge or forfeiture of all pay and allowances). 
 33 Cf. UCMJ arts. 77–134 (Punitive articles); Press Release, Kirsten Gillibrand, N.Y. Senator 
and Chair of Senate Armed Servs. Subcomm. on Pers., on Hearing Examining Sexual Assault in the 
Military (Mar. 13, 2013), available at http://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/
senator-gillibrands-opening-statement-at-armed-services-subcommittee-hearing-examining-sexual-as
saults-in-the-military (stating that Congress should reevaluate the military justice system, especially 
regarding the chain of command, in order to combat sexual assault in the military). 
 34 See James W. Smith III, A Few Good Scapegoats: The Abu Ghraib Courts Martial and the 
Failure of the Military Justice System, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 671, 683 (2006). 
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fenses.35 Service members who commit any criminal offense enumerated in 
the punitive articles (Articles 77–134) may be tried by military court-
martial.36 Punitive Article 120 governs the offense of rape, sexual assault, 
and other sexual misconduct.37 
In order to implement the UCMJ, the President issues the Manual for 
Courts-Martial (MCM), which, in part, analyses the punitive articles by 
providing UCMJ text, elements of each offense, discussion of these ele-
ments, lesser included offenses, maximum permissible punishments, and 
sample specifications.38 The MCM is critical to understanding the rules, 
procedures and crimes articulated by the UCMJ.39 
B. UCMJ’s Role in Reporting and Prosecuting Rape and Sexual Assault 
Traditionally, service members had to report rape or sexual assault di-
rectly to unit commanding officers.40 Unit commanders were responsible 
for orchestrating a preliminary inquiry into the charges, and determining 
whether sufficient evidence existed to reprimand the alleged perpetrator.41 
They had discretion to fully dispose of the charges, take administrative ac-
tion (i.e. letter of reprimand), seek discharge of the service member, resort 
to non-judicial punishment under Article 15 (i.e. reduction in rank, forfei-
ture of pay, restriction to base, extra duties), or initiate the court-martial 
process to pursue criminal charges.42 If the charges were serious, such as an 
                                                                                                                           
 35 MCM, supra note 16, pmbl. I-1, pt. IV-1. 
 36 Id. arts. 77–134. 
 37 UCMJ art. 120. 
 38 See MCM, supra note 16, Preface 1, pt. IV. 
 39 See id. pmbl., I-1, R.C.M. 101–103. 
 40 See Mitsie Smith, Comment, Adding Force Behind Military Sexual Assault Reform: The 
Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Ending Intra-Military Sexual Assault, 19 BUFF. J. GENDER L. 
& SOC. POL’Y 147, 155–57, 160–62 (2011). Military policy changed in 2005 to permit two ways 
to report sexual assault: unrestricted and restricted reporting. Id. Unrestricted reporting is the only 
avenue, however, to initiate an investigation and subsequent prosecution. Id. To do so, the victim 
can report to law enforcement, commanders, Veterans Affairs, or Sexual Assault Response Coor-
dinators. Id.; James Risen, Attacked at 19 by Air Force Trainer, and Giving Voice to Scandal, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013, at A1 (describing one service members hesitancy to report in 2011 
because the person she had to report to was the perpetrator); Jesse Ellison, Leon Panetta Lays Out 
New Rules to Combat Sexual Assault in the U.S. Military, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 18, 2012), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/04/18/leon-panetta-lays-out-new-rules-to-combat-
sexual-assault-in-u-s-military.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (describing how the policy change is 
designed to remove the investigation and charging discretion from less experienced unit com-
manders to more experienced, impartial commanders). 
 41 See MCM, supra note 16, R.C.M. 303 (Preliminary inquiry into reported offenses); Smith, 
supra note 34, at 684. 
 42 See UCMJ art. 32(a) (Investigation); MCM, supra note 16, R.C.M. 401 (Forwarding and 
disposition of charges in general); Smith, supra note 40, at 160–62; Smith, supra note 34, at 684–
87. An Article 32 investigation is comparable to a pre-trial hearing in civilian courts to determine 
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Article 120 rape or sexual assault violation, then they were referred to a 
more thorough and impartial investigation under Article 32.43 Nevertheless, 
at the conclusion of this Article 32 investigation, the commander could still 
dismiss the charges.44 
This process left justice for the victim largely in the hands of his or her 
unit commander.45 Unit commanders, however, are often biased in light of 
their working or personal relationships with the accused.46 They also typi-
cally lack the legal experience to handle these cases, and are operationally 
focused, with little time and attention available to investigate sex crimes.47 
Consequently, an estimated 68 percent of “actionable” cases were not pros-
ecuted due to lower level command discretion in fiscal 2011.48 
In response to the problem of sexual assault in the military, Secretary of 
Defense Leon Panetta announced changes to military policy on April 16, 
2012.49 The new policy provides that unit commanders must report allega-
tions of completed or attempted rape, and sexual assault, to an elevated com-
mander—typically a colonel or captain.50 Secretary Panetta also recommend-
ed establishing “special victims’ units” within each service with specially 
trained investigators to collect evidence, interview, and work with victims.51 
While these policy changes are designed to remove unit commander discre-
tion to investigate and prosecute sexual assault cases, the unit commander is 
not actually removed from the chain of command.52 Rather, he or she is 
charged with a duty to report any serious sexual assaults to a higher authority 
for a more impartial investigation similar to the Article 32 investigation al-
ready in place.53 
Thus, while the policy seeks to prevent sexual assault claims from be-
ing “swept under the rug,” its effectiveness depends on the military’s en-
forcement of unit commanders’ duty to report to higher commanders and of 
those commanders’ election to prosecute, rather than seek lesser punish-
                                                                                                                           
whether a crime was committed and if there is reasonable cause to believe the accused committed 
the crime. See Smith, supra note 40, at 160–61; Smith, supra note 34, at 690–91. Article 32 states, 
“[n]o charge or specification may be referred to a general court-martial for trial until a thorough 
and impartial investigation of all the matters set forth therein has been made.” UCMJ art. 32(a). 
 43 See UCMJ art. 32(a); Smith, supra note 40, at 161. 
 44 See MCM, supra note 16, R.C.M. 401; Smith, supra note 40, at 161–62. 
 45 See Briefing Paper, supra note 10 at *2–3. 
 46 See id. 
 47 See id. 
 48 See id. 
 49 See Daniel, supra note 31. 
 50 See id. 
 51 See id. 
 52 See Risen, supra note 40, at A1; Daniel, supra note 31. 
 53 See UCMJ art. 32(a); Smith, supra note 40, at 161; Daniel, supra note 31. 
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ments like discharge or non-judicial punishments.54 As Secretary Panetta 
said, 
[W]hat is required is that everyone, from the secretary to the chair 
of the Joint Chiefs all the way down at every command level, be 
sensitive to this issue, and be aware that they bear the responsibil-
ity to take action on these cases. The most important thing we can 
do is prosecuting the offenders.55 
The DOD has clearly articulated a duty upon commanders to take ac-
tion and prosecute viable rape and sexual assault cases.56 The question be-
comes: what measures are in place to enforce this duty?57 The doctrine of 
command responsibility provides a potential answer.58 
C. Other Countries’ Responses to Intra-Military Sexual Assault 
Several other countries, including the United Kingdom, Canada, Aus-
tralia, Germany, and Israel, address the problem of intra-military rape and 
command discretion by removing the prosecution of perpetrators to an in-
dependent authority.59 In the United Kingdom, for instance, military com-
manders handle minor offenses and may confer with prosecutors on crimi-
nal cases, but they may not prosecute serious criminal violations.60 Rather, 
the Service Prosecuting Authority tries all military service branch crimes.61 
Canada adopted a similar system in 1992 to ensure an impartial trial free of 
command discretion.62 
Similarly, Australia and Germany refer all serious crimes to civilian 
authorities, thereby completely removing prosecution from the military jus-
tice system.63 Israel also eliminated command discretion, but by conferring 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See Memorandum from Martin E. Dempsey & Leon E. Panetta, supra note 1, at 1; Laura 
Bassett, Leon Panetta: Military’s Handling of Rape is ‘An Outrage,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 
27, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/27/leon-panetta-military-rape_n_1919393.html 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014); Daniel, supra note 31; Ellison, supra note 40. 
 55 See Ellison, supra note 40. 
 56 See id. 
 57 Cf. Smith, supra note 40, at 148–50 (describing how UCMJ measures to combat sexual 
assault are inadequate). 
 58 Cf. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 28 (incorporating a traditional definition of interna-
tional command responsibility); Smith, supra note 40, at 148–50. 
 59 See Alex Seitz-Wald, Answer to Military’s Sexual Assault Problem May Be Overseas, SALON 
(June 5, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/06/05/answer_to_militarys_sexual_assault_problem_
may_be_overseas/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
 60 See id. 
 61 See id. 
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. 
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sole authority to the Military Advocate General (MAG), an independent 
body, to pursue criminal charges.64 The MAG is required only to notify the 
commander about charges against subordinates.65 
While these avenues of removing command discretion have seen suc-
cess in other countries, the United States remains resistant to relinquishing 
military control over the prosecution of military-related crimes.66 Thus, 
adopting command responsibility within the UCMJ is one way to ensure 
that commanders prosecute service members who commit rape and sexual 
assault without usurping jurisdiction from the military.67 
II. DISCUSSION 
To invoke the international doctrine of command responsibility—
holding commanders criminally liable for the atrocities of their subordi-
nates—three general elements must exist regardless of the forum.68 First, a 
superior-subordinate relationship must exist, which is clearly present in the 
military command context but sometimes extends to civilian leaders as 
well.69 Second, the command or superior must either have actual or con-
structive knowledge of the subordinate’s past or impending crimes.70 The 
definition of this mens rea prong is highly contested because some interna-
tional tribunals require actual knowledge while others maintain a negli-
gence or reckless standard of imputed knowledge.71 Third, the commander 
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supra note 68, at 160. 
 70 See Damaska, supra note 68, at 455; Hansen, supra note 12, at 404; Parker, supra note 69, 
at 25; Russell-Brown, supra note 68, at 160. 
 71 See Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 28 (depicting a should have known negligence stand-
ard for command responsibility); U.S. v. von Leeb, VIII L. Rep. of Trials of War Criminals 1, 76 
(U.N. War Crimes Comm’n 1948) (High Command Case); U.S. v. List, VIII L. Rep. of Trials of 
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must have failed to take reasonable measures to prevent or punish the 
crimes.72 
Command responsibility is an ancient doctrine, with its origins dating 
back to the trial of Peter Van Hagenbach in the 15th Century.73 This doctrine 
did not fully crystalize in international law, however, until the World War II 
Tribunals, chiefly the Tokyo Tribunals and the famous trial of General 
Tomoyuki Yamashita.74 An analysis of command responsibility’s develop-
ment, especially interpretations of the mens rea element, is critical to deter-
mine the applicability of the doctrine to the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ).75 
A. Development of Command Responsibility in International Law 
1. Post World War II Military Tribunals Adopt Command Responsibility 
On August 8, 1945, immediately following the conclusion of WWII, 
the Allies established the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg to 
prosecute war criminals.76 The agreement giving rise to the Tribunal, the 
London Charter, enabled the prosecution of superior officers “participating 
in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit 
any of the foregoing crimes,” regardless of whether they actually executed 
such plans.77 The Allies enacted and enforced similar regulations to address 
                                                                                                                           
War Criminals 1, 34 (U.N. War Crimes Comm’n 1948) (Hostage Case); Hansen, supra note 11, at 
369, 400, 404, 406. 
 72 See Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 28; Hansen, supra note 12, at 386, 408–09; Ronen, 
supra note 69, at 316; Russell-Brown, supra note 68, at 160. 
 73 See O’Reilly, supra note 19, at 74–75; Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: 
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(2000). In 1474, the Holy Roman Empire tried Peter von Hagenbach for his subordinates’ atroci-
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TRIALS 13, 13, 15–20 (Kevin Heller & Gerry Simpson eds., 2013). 
 74 See O’Reilly, supra note 19, at 74–75. 
 75 Cf. Hansen, supra note 11, at 344–45, 359, 364–65, 368–69, 370–71, 372, 376–77, 380–83, 
385–86 (summarizing command responsibility’s development in international law, with particular 
focus on the mens rea element, prior to suggesting its incorporation within the UCMJ); O’Reilly, 
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 76 See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis art. 7, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1548, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288 [hereinafter Lon-
don Charter]; Hansen, supra note 11, at 353; Smidt, supra note 73, at 174. 
 77 See London Charter, supra note 76, art. 6; Hansen, supra note 11, at 353; O’Reilly, supra 
note 19, at 74–75; Smidt, supra note 73, at 175. 
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war crimes committed throughout Asia during WWII.78 The trial of General 
Tomoyuki Yamashita in 1945 is one of the first cases to extend command-
ers’ criminal liability beyond affirmative defenses and include the failure to 
effectively command.79 
The tribunal found General Yamashita guilty of his subordinates’ war 
crimes, including the rape and sexual assault of hundreds of women in Ma-
nila, because he failed to adequately supervise them.80 Although prosecutors 
were not able to prove that Yamashita ordered or even knew about his sub-
ordinates’ atrocities, the Military Commission determined that the “crimes 
were so extensive and widespread, both as to time and area, that they must 
either have been willfully permitted by [Yamashita], or secretly ordered by 
[him].”81 This case illustrates that, under command responsibility, com-
manders can be held criminally liable for subordinates’ acts absent actual 
knowledge of their occurrence.82 The Court in Yamashita failed, however, to 
articulate the degree of mental culpability, whether negligence or a higher 
standard, required for command liability.83 
In the wake of WWII, numerous other war crime trials occurred 
throughout Europe—chief among these were United States v. Wilhelm von 
Leeb (High Command Case) and United States v. Wilhelm List (Hostage 
Case), both of which transpired from 1947 to 1948.84 The Hostage Case es-
tablished a “knew or ought to have known” standard similar to Yamashita, 
permitting proof by constructive knowledge.85 In contrast, the High Com-
mand Case required further proof of “personal neglect amounting to a wan-
ton, immoral disregard of the action of his subordinates amounting to acqui-
                                                                                                                           
 78 See London Charter, supra note 76, art. 6; O’Reilly, supra note 19, at 74–75 (describing the 
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escence.”86 Thus, the latter Court called for a heightened reckless or willful 
blindness standard of mens rea.87 
2. Subsequent Codification of Command Responsibility 
The adoption in 1977, of Article 86 of the Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Convention of 1949 (Article 86) was the first treaty-based codifica-
tion of command responsibility in international law.88 Article 86 pertinently 
states that commanders shall be liable for subordinates’ breaches of the 
Convention or Protocol 
if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them 
to conclude in the circumstances at the time that [the subordinate] 
was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they 
did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or 
repress the breach.89 
Thus, Article 86 punishes a commanding officer’s failure to prevent viola-
tions of international law, thereby punishing commanders not only for af-
firmative acts or direct participation, but also for omissions.90 The drafters 
rejected proposals to incorporate a lesser negligence mens rea and instead 
adopted a heightened reckless or willful blindness standard.91 
As a result of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the international 
community established The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993, to prosecute superiors and perpetrators of 
crimes against humanity, including the rape, torture, and murder of Bosnian, 
Muslim, and Croatian prisoners.92 Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute held 
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commanders responsible if they “knew or had reason to know that the sub-
ordinate was either about to commit the crime or had already done so; and 
. . . failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the 
crime or to punish the subordinate perpetrator after the event.”93 Hence, Ar-
ticle 7(3) clearly articulated the commander’s duty to punish his subordi-
nates’ violations, the failure of which may result in prosecution of the com-
mander as well as the subordinate.94 
Though the ICTY statutory language facially establishes a negligence 
standard, the ICTY Trial Chamber ultimately adopted a heightened standard 
that required the prosecution to prove that the superior was on notice of his 
or her subordinate’s crimes.95 In 2000, in Prosecutor v. Blaskic, however, 
the ICTY Trial Chamber originally adhered to a negligence standard, stating 
that “ignorance cannot be a defence where the absence of knowledge is the 
result of negligence in the discharge” of the commander’s duties.96 
Overruling this lower standard, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in 2001 
subsequently concluded in Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., commonly referred 
to as the Celebici case, that a commander would be held liable if he 
had in his possession such information that should have put him 
on notice of the fact that an unlawful act was being, or about to 
be, committed by a subordinate . . . This is a reference to infor-
mation, which, if at hand, would oblige the commander to obtain 
more information (i.e. conduct further inquiry), and he therefore 
‘had reason to know.’97 
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Thus, the Celebici standard—had reason to know—is one of willful blind-
ness, not ordinary negligence.98 
 Similar to its response following the Yugoslavia atrocities, the interna-
tional community enacted a statute to prosecute leaders and subordinates in 
the Rwandan crisis who committed human rights and genocide violations, 
including widespread sexual violence.99 Article 6(3) of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) codified command re-
sponsibility almost identically to the ICTY, and held superiors liable for 
subordinates’ acts that they knew or should have known of and failed to 
prevent or punish.100 Although the ICTR Trial Chamber also has conflicting 
interpretations of the mens rea standard, it adopted a lower “had reason to 
know” negligence standard in the more recent case, Prosecutor v. Bagili-
shema, in 2001.101 The ICTR Trial Chamber identified three ways in which 
this standard could be met: 1) actual knowledge of the subordinate’s crimes; 
2) information putting the commander “on notice of the risk of such offens-
es by indicating the need for additional investigation. . .”; or 3) failure to 
learn about the offenses that “under the circumstances he or she should have 
known.”102 
Ultimately, Article 28 of the Rome Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC) codifies the doctrine of command responsibility as a provi-
sion of international criminal law.103 The statute recognizes the command-
er’s international duty “to take all necessary and reasonable measures with-
in his or her power to prevent or repress [the subordinate’s] commission [of 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court] or to submit the matter to the 
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competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.”104 Additionally, 
the Rome Statute distinguishes between civilian and military superiors, as-
signing a negligence standard to the former but a heightened recklessness 
standard to the latter.105 
In summation, while different bodies of international law require vary-
ing degrees of mental culpability to hold commanders criminally liable for 
their subordinates’ acts, both customary and codified international law 
clearly recognize the doctrine of command responsibility.106 
B. Domestic Law’s Assimilation of Command Responsibility 
1. Historical Incorporation of Command Responsibility into U.S. Military 
Law 
U.S military law has, at various times, enforced command responsibil-
ity for a failure to investigate or punish, either as a matter of dereliction of 
duty, or liability for the subordinate’s substantive offense.107 Superior offic-
ers’ duty to punish their subordinates’ crimes dates back to the Revolution-
ary War.108 
In 1775, in anticipation of the Revolutionary War, the Provisional 
Congress adopted the Massachusetts Articles of War, Article 11, which dic-
tated a commander’s duty to “keep good order, and, to the utmost of his 
power, redress all such abuses or disorders which may be committed by any 
officer or soldier under his command . . . .”109 Further, the Article provided 
for punishment of any commander who “refuse[d] or omit[ted] to see jus-
tice done on the offender or offenders . . . as if he himself had committed 
the crimes or disorders complained of.”110 Thus, military law could hold 
superior officers criminally liable for their subordinates’ crimes, unless they 
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punished the subordinates.111 Congress later enacted an identical provision 
in Section IX of the American Articles of War of 1776.112 
2. Current Fusion of Command Responsibility with U.S. Military Doctrine 
Today, the United States holds enemy commanders liable as principals 
for acts committed by their subordinates in certain situations.113 Specifical-
ly, the Military Commission Act of 2006 punishes an adversary commander 
as a principal if he or she “knew, had reason to know, or should have 
known, that a subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so 
and [the superior] failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.”114 
Dereliction of duty, however, is the preferred form of liability for U.S. 
commanders who fail to punish their troops’ crimes.115 During the Vietnam 
War, for instance, fourteen officers were charged with dereliction of duty 
for failure to report and investigate after the U.S. military shot, killed, and 
sexually abused approximately 500 unarmed Vietnamese civilians, mostly 
women, children, and old men, in retaliation for the deaths of U.S. soldiers 
by guerrilla warfare in 1968.116 Despite Lieutenant General William Peers’ 
confirmation that “at least two rapes were committed by the 2nd Platoon, 
and in one case the rapist is reported to have then shoved the muzzle of his 
M-16 rifle into the vagina of the victim and pulled the trigger,” the military 
nonetheless dropped the three formal rape charges initially filed.117 
Similarly, in 2005, after U.S. Marines shot and killed twenty-four Iraqi 
civilians in the town of Haditha, four officers were charged with dereliction, 
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for failure to report the incident and failure to initiate an investigation.118 
These cases illustrate the United States’ willingness to prosecute command-
ers for their subordinates’ atrocities, but as derelictions of duty rather than 
substantive war crimes.119 
3. U.S. Courts’ Imposition of Superior Responsibility on Individual 
Civilians for Human Rights Abuses 
U.S. courts, however, have been willing to apply superior responsibil-
ity, which originated from command responsibility, to individuals responsi-
ble for international human rights abuses.120 Thus, based on ICTY and 
ICTR precedent, U.S. courts have expanded the traditional scope of com-
mand responsibility from the commission of military war crimes to civilian 
human rights abuses, like torture, during peacetime.121 Superior responsibil-
ity claims can arise in U.S. courts under the Torture Victims Protection Act 
(TVPA), and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), to address crimes of torture, gen-
ocide, or extrajudicial killings.122 The TVPA’s legislative history acknowl-
edges that the Senate intended liability to extend to “anyone with higher 
authority who authorized, tolerated or knowingly ignored those acts 
. . . .”123 
As a result, in 2004 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
Court of California determined in Doe v. Qi that the TVPA is not limited to 
military commanders’ responsibility for war crimes, but also extends to ci-
vilian responsibility for torture and extrajudicial killings.124 Thus, in Doe, 
Mayor Qi of Beijing was held civilly liable for the detention, torture, beat-
ing and sexual assault committed by the Beijing police, because he had the 
authority to supervise and discipline police forces but failed to do so.125 
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Similarly, in Ford v. Garcia in 2002, the 11th Circuit U.S. Court of 
Appeals adopted the ICTY’s Celebici standard, which extended civil re-
sponsibility for summary execution and disappearances to anyone in a posi-
tion of higher authority who had “material ability to prevent or punish crim-
inal conduct.”126 In Ford, two former Salvadoran Generals were charged 
under the TVPA for torture, sexual assault, and murder of four U.S. 
churchwomen by Salvadoran National Guardsmen.127 
Likewise, in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos in 1996, the 9th Circuit applied 
command responsibility to human rights violations occurring during peace-
time.128 The trial court held that the former Philippines president could be 
civilly liable for the military’s torture, summary execution, and disappear-
ance of civilians under the ATS if he knew of the military’s misconduct and 
failed to use his power to prevent it.129 To support this transition from mili-
tary war crimes to civilian international human rights abuses, the Court rec-
ognized that the goal “to protect civilian populations and prisoners . . . from 
brutality,” transcends the law of war to international human rights law.130 
Consequently, U.S. courts appear willing to extend a strain of command 
responsibility to civilian leaders for subordinates’ human rights abuses dur-
ing peacetime.131 
4. Current UCMJ Provisions Compatible with Command Responsibility 
While command responsibility is not codified within the UCMJ, sev-
eral of its provisions already impose an affirmative duty upon commanders 
to prevent, investigate, or punish UCMJ violations.132 These include the 
preamble’s jurisdiction discussion, Article 18 (Jurisdiction), Rule 303’s duty 
                                                                                                                           
 126 See Ford ex rel. Estate of Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1286, 1288–90 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(citing Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT- 96-21-T, Appeals Chamber, ¶ 156 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001) (Celebici)); Cortney C. Hoecherl, Command Responsibility 
Doctrine: Formulation Through Ford v. Garcia and Romagoza v. Garcia, 5 J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 
5, 11, 15–17 (2007), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/jilp/articles/1-
1_Hoecherl_Cortney.pdf; Parker, supra note 69, at 11. 
 127 See Ford, 289 F.3d at 1283; Hoecherl, supra note 126, at 11. The district court applied the 
doctrine of command responsibility to the case, although they incorrectly instructed the jury about 
a proximate cause element, resulting in the acquittal of the defendants. See Hoecherl, supra note 
126, at 10–14. The 11th Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision due to invited error in the 
jury instructions. See id. at 16. 
 128 See Hilao, 103 F.3d at 767, 771; Parker, supra note 69, at 11–12. 
 129 See Hilao, 103 F.3d at 767, 771, 779 (resulting in a judgment for the plaintiffs). 
 130 Id. at 777. 
 131 See id.; Parker, supra note 69, at 5–6, 11–12. 
 132 See, e.g., UCMJ arts. 18 (Jurisdiction), 77 (Principals), 78 (Accessory after the fact), 92 
(Discussion); MCM, supra note 16, pmbl., I-1 (Sources of military jurisdiction), R.C.M. 201 (Ju-
risdiction), R.C.M. 303; Sepinwall, supra note 12, at 274–75; Smidt, supra note 73, at 233. 
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to investigate, Article 77 (Principals), Article 78 (Accessory after the fact), 
and Article 92 (Dereliction of duty).133 These provisions, however, have not 
yet been used to hold commanders responsible for their failure to prevent or 
respond to sexual assault reports.134 
The preamble of the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) declares inter-
national law as one of the sources of military jurisdiction, including the law 
of war.135 As command responsibility is an internationally recognized doc-
trine, both according to custom and treaty, it falls within the scope of U.S. 
military jurisdiction.136 Furthermore, Article 18 articulates that courts-
martial jurisdiction extends to “any person who by the law of war is subject 
to trial by a military tribunal and may adjudge any punishment permitted by 
the law of war.”137 Since the law of war recognizes commanders’ substan-
tive liability for subordinate’s war crimes, and numerous UCMJ offenses 
(i.e., murder, manslaughter, and rape) are analogous to law of war viola-
tions, Article 18 on its face permits the imposition of command responsibil-
ity within the UCMJ for serious violations.138 
Rule 303 articulates a commander’s duty to investigate suspected vio-
lations of the UCMJ.139 The rule specifically states, “[u]pon receipt of in-
formation that a member of the command is accused or suspected of com-
mitting an offense or offenses triable by court-martial, the immediate com-
mander shall make or cause to be made a preliminary inquiry into the 
charges or suspected offenses.”140 The MCM further expounds that, “[t]he 
inquiry should gather all reasonably available evidence bearing on guilt or 
innocence and any evidence relating to aggravation, extenuation, or mitiga-
tion.”141 The preliminary inquiry need not be formal, and typically consists 
of an investigative report or summary of evidence relating to the charges.142 
                                                                                                                           
 133 See, e.g., UCMJ arts. 18, 77, 78, 92; MCM, supra note 16, pmbl., I-1, R.CM. 201, 303; 
Hansen, supra note 11, at 388–89, 395–97 (articulating how UCMJ articles 77, 78, and 92 parallel 
command responsibility but fall short of fully incorporating the doctrine); Smidt, supra note 73, at 
194–96 (describing how U.S. Captain Medina was charged with an Article 77 violation as princi-
pal for his subordinates’ war crimes committed during the Vietnam War); Briefing Paper, supra 
note 10 (noting that low-level command discretion halts 68 percent of actionable cases from pro-
ceeding to courts-martial). 
 134 See UCMJ arts. 18, 77, 78, 92; Hansen, supra note 11, at 388–89, 395–97. 
 135 MCM, supra note 16, pmbl., I-1. 
 136 See id.; O’Reilly, supra note 19, at 78–79, 85, 87–88 (explaining the customary and doc-
trinal incorporation of command responsibility in international law). 
 137 UCMJ art. 18; MCM, supra note 16, pmbl., I-1. 
 138 UCMJ art. 18, Hansen, supra note 11, at 337, 389 (defining command responsibility and 
comparing serious UCMJ violations to law of war violations). 
 139 See MCM, supra note 16, R.C.M. 303. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See id. 
 142 See id. 
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Thus, commanders bear a duty to investigate any suspected offenses, and 
this duty requires them to search for any “reasonably available” evidence.143 
Consequently, a commander who ignores a rape allegation breaches his duty 
to investigate any suspected offenses.144 
The UCMJ also incorporates the common law doctrines of accomplice 
and accessory liability (Articles 77 and 78 respectively), which, though too 
narrow to encompass command responsibility, approach holding command-
ers’ liable for failure to investigate and prosecute crimes.145 For example, 
Article 77 limits principal liability to one who “aids, abets, counsels, com-
mands, or procures its commission; or . . . causes an act to be done . . . .”146 
Article 77 also establishes that “a person need not personally perform the 
acts necessary to constitute an offense to be guilty of it,” which is the under-
lying premise of command responsibility.147 Additionally, the UCMJ does 
not require the principal’s presence at the scene of the crime in order to hold 
the party liable for the perpetrator’s violations, similar to command respon-
sibility.148 
Article 78’s crime of accessory after the fact also approaches the doc-
trine of command responsibility, by imposing liability on anyone “who, 
knowing that an offense punishable by this chapter has been committed, 
receives, comforts, or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his 
apprehension, trial, or punishment shall be punished as a court-martial may 
direct.”149 To prove an Article 78 violation, the prosecutor must establish 
that: 1) an offense punishable by the code was committed; 2) of which the 
accused was aware; and 3) the accused received, comforted, or assisted the 
offender; 4) for the purpose of hindering or preventing the apprehension, 
trial, or punishment of the offender.150 
With respect to the second element, the MCM requires proof of actual 
knowledge of the original violation, either via direct or circumstantial evi-
dence.151 Additionally, the MCM explains that merely failing to report an of-
                                                                                                                           
 143 See id. 
 144 See UCMJ art. 120; MCM, supra note 16, R.C.M. 303. 
 145 See UCMJ arts. 77, 78; Hansen, supra note 11, at 388–89. 
 146 See UCMJ arts. 77, 78; MCM, supra note 16, R.C.M. 303; Hansen, supra note 11, at 388–
89 (articulating how the UCMJ’s punitive articles fall short of fully encompassing command re-
sponsibility). 
 147 See Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 28 (incorporating a traditional definition of com-
mand responsibility); MCM, supra note 16, art. 77. 
 148 Compare Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 28 (“[C]ommitted by forces under his or her 
effective command and control . . . .”), with MCM, supra note 16, art. 77 (“[A]ids, abets, counsels, 
commands, or procures its commission . . . .”). 
 149 See UCMJ art. 78; MCM, supra note 16, art. 78; Hansen, supra note 11, at 388–89. 
 150 See MCM, supra note 16, art. 78. 
 151 See id. 
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fense is not sufficient to satisfy the offense.152 If a commander nonetheless is 
aware that an alleged rape or sexual assault occurred, and yet makes no effort 
to investigate the rape further, to determine its validity or to punish the perpe-
trator, then she or he essentially assists the perpetrator by hindering his appre-
hension, trial, and punishment.153 Additionally, someone found to be an Arti-
cle 78 accessory after the fact is guilty of the primary offense, not a lesser-
included offense, thus holding the accessory guilty of the substantive of-
fense.154 Consequently, Articles 77 and 78 are avenues through which com-
manders could be punished for failure to prevent, investigate or punish their 
subordinates’ crimes, but low-level command discretion dismisses 68 percent 
of actionable sexual assault cases.155 
Article 92’s failure to obey an order or regulation provision provides 
for punishment of dereliction of duty similar to one application of command 
responsibility.156 Subsection 3 of Article 92 holds individuals liable for be-
ing derelict in the performance of their duties.157 To prove dereliction of 
duties, the prosecutor must show that: 1) the accused has certain duties; 2) 
that he or she knew of or reasonably should have known of; and 3) the ac-
cused was willfully, negligently or culpably inefficient, and therefore dere-
lict in performing those duties.158 Dereliction of duty is treated as a sepa-
rate, lesser offense, and thus, the punishment is limited to forfeiture of pay, 
temporary confinement, and bad-conduct discharge.159 In light of com-
manders’ duties to investigate potential offenses under Rule 303, a Com-
mander who fails to investigate an offense could be charged with dereliction 
of duty.160 If convicted, however, the commander can serve up to six 
months in confinement, which is hardly appropriate to address “the inherent 
stigma deserving of a war crime.”161 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See MCM, supra note 16, pt. IV-3. Failing to report an offense may violate a general order 
or regulation though, which could satisfy an Article 92 violation or a misprision of a serious of-
fense under Article 134. Id. 
 153 See UCMJ art. 120. 
 154 See MCM, supra note 16, art. 78. 
 155 See id. arts. 77–78; Hansen, supra note 11, at 388–89, 395–97; Briefing Paper, supra note 
10 (noting that low-level command discretion halts 68 percent of actionable cases from proceed-
ing to courts-martial) 
 156 See MCM, supra note 16, art. 92; Sepinwall, supra note 12, at 274–84 (describing the 
United States’ use of command responsibility to try commanders with dereliction of duty for fail-
ing to prevent or punish their subordinates’ Haditha and My Lai atrocities). 
 157 MCM, supra note 16, art. 92. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id.; Hansen, supra note 11, at 394–95. 
 160 See MCM, supra note 16, R.C.M. 303, art. 92. 
 161 See id. art. 92; Hansen, supra note 11, at 394–97; Sepinwall, supra note 12, at 275. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Incorporating an Appropriate Standard of Command  
Responsibility Within the UCMJ 
Taken together, the aforementioned UCMJ provisions are compatible 
with command responsibility.162 Further, these provisions are ineffective in 
preventing intra-military rape and sexual assault as evidenced by persistent 
and increased reports of military sexual violence.163 Applying command 
responsibility to serious violations of the UCMJ would establish a clear 
mandate for the military to prosecute any commander who fails to reasona-
bly prevent, investigate, or punish a serious violation of the UCMJ that he 
or she knew about, either via constructive or actual knowledge.164 General-
ly, the U.S. military charges service members with UCMJ violations under 
the punitive articles, rather than the law of war violations.165 Thus, service 
members’ perpetrations of rape should be tried as UCMJ violations, not law 
of war violations.166 Accordingly, in order to hold commanders responsible 
for failures to prevent, investigate, or punish subordinates’ perpetrations of 
rape, Congress should incorporate command responsibility within the 
UCMJ.167 Adopting command responsibility to hold commanders criminally 
liable for their subordinates’ serious UCMJ violations is further supported 
                                                                                                                           
 162 See UCMJ arts. 18, 77, 78, 92; MCM, supra note 16, R.C.M. 303, arts. 77, 78, 92; Hansen, 
supra note 11, at 388–89, 395–97. 
 163 Cf. UCMJ arts. 18, 77, 78, 92; MCM, supra note 16, R.C.M. 303, arts. 77, 78, 92; 2011 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 28 (estimating that 19,000 service members were sexually 
assaulted in 2010); Schmid, supra note 3, at 477 (describing the increased reporting of military 
sexual assaults despite Congressional reform measures); Smith, supra note 40, at 157 (discussing 
the upward trend in reporting intra-military sexual assaults). 
 164 See Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 28; Hansen, supra note 11, at 414 (proposing that the 
military adopt command responsibility within the UCMJ under a revised Article 92 in order to 
deter abuses like those committed at Abu Ghraib); Russell-Brown, supra note 68, at 130 (propos-
ing the expansion of command responsibility in the ICC to hold commanders criminally liable for 
their subordinates’ commission of gender crimes in armed conflict); Smidt, supra note 73, at 233 
(proposing that domestic military courts-martial apply the international doctrine of command 
responsibility to UCMJ violations via Article 18). 
 165 See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 27–10 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL: THE 
LAW OF LAND WARFARE app. A-120, ¶ 507(b) (1956). 
 166 See UCMJ art. 120. 
 167 See id.; cf. Hansen, supra note 11, at 412–14 (proposing that the military adopt command 
responsibility within the UCMJ to deter law of war violations like those committed at Abu Ghraib, 
not UCMJ violations, under a revised dereliction of duty provision); Smidt, supra note 73, at 233–
34 (suggesting the United States incorporate command responsibility within the UCMJ, but to 
deter subordinates’ commission of war crimes, not intra-military UCMJ violations like rape and 
sexual assault). 
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by the fact that U.S. courts already hold civilian leaders civilly liable for 
their subordinates’ human rights abuses during foreign internal conflicts.168 
Incorporating command responsibility within the UCMJ is consistent 
with its goal of balancing commander control and disciplining of troops, 
with due process trial concerns.169 The UCMJ recognizes that “discipline 
cannot be maintained without justice,” and that commanders are integral 
figures in the administration of military justice.170 The commander is “the 
individual that establishes the command climate—the unit’s collective sense 
of right and wrong.”171 According to U.S. Army doctrine, a commander as-
sumes responsibility for the “actions, accomplishments, or failures of a unit. 
He is responsible for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of personnel 
. . . .”172 Consequently, commanders play a critical role in ensuring that their 
subordinates abide by the UCMJ, in part by disciplining any subordinates’ 
violations of the punitive articles.173 
When commanders fail to reasonably punish subordinates’ UCMJ vio-
lations, they effectively acquiesce to, or condone, the behavior, thereby un-
dermining the UCMJ and the justice it strives to achieve.174 When com-
manders turn a blind eye to intra-military rape and sexual assault, they im-
plicitly acquiesce to the conduct, engendering a command climate accepting 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 777 (9th Cir. 1996) (describing how the 
United States is willing to use command responsibility to hold civilian leaders liable for authoriz-
ing, tolerating, or knowingly ignoring abuses, like torture, summary execution, or disappearances); 
Parker, supra note 69, at 11–12 (describing how superior responsibility was used in Hilao to apply 
command responsibility to torture committed during peacetime). 
 169 See Allen J. Dickerson, Who’s in Charge Here?—International Criminal Court Complemen-
tarity and the Commander’s Role in Courts-Martial, 54 NAVAL L. REV. 141, 159 (2007); Parks, 
supra note 107, at 76 (citing DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, REMINISCENCES 298 (1964)) (explaining that 
commanders can be held liable for their subordinates’ abuses, and to hold otherwise would under-
mine the command function); Beth Hillman, Chains of Command, LEGAL AFFAIRS, May–June 2002, 
available at http://legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2002/review_hillman_mayjun2002.msp (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
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Symposium Edition, 165 MIL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2000); see Dickerson, supra note 169, at 159; Smidt, 
supra note 73, at 159. 
 171 Smidt, supra note 73, at 159. 
 172 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 101-5, STAFF ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS, I-
1 (1997); Smidt, supra note 73, at 165. 
 173 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20 ARMY COMMAND POLICY ¶ 2-1b (Mar. 30, 1988); 
Smidt, supra note 73 at 165. 
 174 See MCM, supra note 16, pmbl., I-1 (identifying two goals of military law: to promote 
justice and to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces); Sepinwall, 
supra note 12, at 299 (arguing that a commander’s failure to punish his subordinate’s crime can 
not only lead to future crimes, but also be an expressive injury against the victim). 
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of sexual violence.175 In order to combat this climate and ensure compliance 
with Punitive Article 120, which prohibits rape and sexual assault, the Unit-
ed States should hold commanders liable under command responsibility for 
their subordinates’ violations.176 The adoption of command responsibility 
would ensure better UCMJ compliance by deterring commanders’ derelic-
tion of their investigative and disciplinary responsibilities and holding them 
liable for any lapses that do occur.177 
With respect to Article 120 rape and sexual assault violations, com-
mand responsibility would be applicable to commanders in two general 
scenarios—failure to prevent, and failure to investigate or punish.178 In the 
former, the commander fails to reasonably respond to reports of sexual har-
assment or violence, which later escalate to sexual assault or rape.179 Here, 
the commander’s failure to respond to preliminary reports contributes, at 
least in part, to the resulting crime because his or her inaction amounted to 
acquiescence.180 Had the commander taken efforts to investigate and repri-
mand the perpetrator, the later crime may not have occurred.181 In the latter 
scenario, the commander fails to investigate or punish a reported rape or 
sexual assault, thereby impeding justice by letting the perpetrator off the 
hook, and contributing to a command climate that tolerates sexual vio-
lence.182 
                                                                                                                           
 175 See Schmid, supra note 3, at 492–93, 505–06 (describing the misogynistic military culture 
that contributes to sexual violence and how military policies and leaders reinforce this culture); 
Sepinwall, supra note 12, at 299. 
 176 Cf. UCMJ art. 120; Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 28; Hansen, supra note 11, at 414 
(proposing that the military adopt command responsibility within the UCMJ under a revised Arti-
cle 92 in order to deter abuses like those committed at Abu Ghraib); Schmid, supra note 3, at 505–
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gynistic military culture that contributes to intra-military sexual violence); Sepinwall, supra note 
12, at 299 (noting that commanders’ failure to punish sexual assault signals that these violations 
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 177 See Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 28; Sepinwall, supra note 12, at 302 (proposing that 
commanders’ failure to punish their subordinates’ violations should be held criminally liable for 
the underlying atrocity); Briefing Paper, supra note 10 (noting that low-level command discretion 
halts 68 percent of actionable cases from proceeding to courts-martial). 
 178 See UCMJ art. 120; see also Damaska, supra note 68, at 461 (articulating how command 
responsibility applies to both failures to prevent and failures to punish); Russell-Brown, supra 
note 68, at 143–44 (summarizing Professor Damaska’s argument that failure to prevent and failure 
to punish are two variants of command responsibility). 
 179 See Damaska, supra note 68, at 461; Russell-Brown, supra note 68, at 144. 
 180 See Damaska, supra note 68, at 461–62 (“The first relates to those situations in which 
superiors ‘know’ that their subordinates are about to commit a crime, but fail to take appropriate 
measures to prevent them.”); Russell-Brown, supra note 68, at 144. 
 181 See Damaska, supra note 68, at 461–62; Russell-Brown, supra note 68, at 144. 
 182 See Damaska, supra note 68, at 467–68; O’Reilly, supra note 19, at 72; Russell-Brown, 
supra note 68, at 144; Sepinwall, supra note 12, at 299 (arguing that a commander’s failure to 
punish his subordinate’s crime signals tolerance by the whole military). 
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An analysis of these two scenarios, paying particular attention to the 
role of causation and personal culpability, is essential in order to adopt a 
standard of command responsibility that is appropriately tailored to domes-
tic violations of the UCMJ, rather than international war crimes.183 In order 
to adopt command responsibility, Congress would first need to debate and 
define appropriate standards of actus reus, mens rea, and punishment.184 
1. Actus Reus—A Duty to Prevent, Investigate and Punish Intra-Military 
Sexual Violence 
To impose liability, criminal law mandates some guilty act or conduct, 
otherwise known as the actus reus requirement.185 The actus reus is typical-
ly an affirmative act that results in social harm.186 In certain limited situa-
tions where a legal duty exists, however, an omission, or failure to act, will 
suffice.187 The traditional doctrine of command responsibility imposes lia-
bility on commanders for their failure to prevent or punish subordinates’ 
war crimes.188 Thus, in proving the commander’s criminal liability, the ac-
tus reus rests in an omission—the commander’s failure to take reasonable 
steps to prevent or punish the subordinate’s crimes despite having a legal 
duty to do so.189 
In 1948, the Yamashita Tribunal determined that commanders have a 
duty to “provide effective control” of their troops as “required by the cir-
                                                                                                                           
 183 Cf. Damaska, supra note 68, at 461 (identifying the failure to prevent and failure to punish 
variants of command responsibility, as well as how command responsibility’s disregard of causa-
tion runs counter to accomplice liability); Hansen, supra note 11, at 411 (proposing that punish-
ment should reflect the degree of culpability as evidenced by the commander’s level of mens rea). 
 184 Cf. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 28; Damaska, supra note 68, at 461, 470 (articulating 
how command responsibility applies to both failures to prevent and failures to punish and how 
these scenarios can create problems with the culpability principle); O’Reilly, supra note 19, at 93–
95 (comparing the various command responsibility mens rea standards and how they interact with 
the culpability principle); Parker, supra note 69, at 7 (arguing that superior responsibility should 
require corporate officers to prevent or remedy human rights abuses to deter future crimes); Rus-
sell-Brown, supra note 68, at 143–44 (summarizing Professor Damaska’s argument that failure to 
prevent and failure to punish are two variants of command responsibility); Sepinwall, supra note 
12, at 298–99 (discussing the importance of causation and culpability in defining the scope of 
command responsibility). 
 185 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 9.02(A) (3rd ed. 2001); 
O’Reilly, supra note 19, at 95–96. 
 186 See DRESSLER, supra note 185, § 9.01(A) (noting that actus reus is an act that causes so-
cial harm). 
 187 See O’Reilly, supra note 19, at 96. 
 188 See Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 28. 
 189 See id.; see also O’Reilly, supra note 19, at 96–98 (describing how command responsibil-
ity imposes liability for commanders’ omissions in the face of a legal duty). 
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cumstances.”190 This broad standard of command responsibility fails to 
clearly identify what actions or omissions rise to the level of criminal cul-
pability for the subordinate’s crime.191 Later that year in the High Command 
Case, however, the Tribunal articulated that a commander has a duty to 
properly supervise his subordinates and prevent their commission of war 
crimes; any wanton or immoral disregard of this duty, amounting to acqui-
escence, satisfies the actus reus requirement.192 The Tribunal further de-
clared in the Hostage Case that military commanders have a “duty to main-
tain order, punish crime, and protect lives and property” in occupied territo-
ries.193 Following the Post-World War II Tribunals, courts continued to re-
fine the actus reus element of command responsibility, ultimately requiring 
commanders to take appropriate measures to prevent, suppress, and punish 
war crimes.194 These appropriate measures vary, depending on whether the 
failure to prevent, or failure to investigate and punish strand of command 
responsibility applies.195 
Inherent in their responsibilities to maintain order and discipline 
amongst their subordinates, and as articulated by Article 77’s principal lia-
bility, Article 78’s accessory liability, and Rule 303’s duty to investigate, 
commanders have a duty to prevent, investigate, and punish subordinates’ 
UCMJ violations—a duty that extends beyond war crimes to intra-military 
rape and sexual assault.196 In the first scenario, where the commander fails 
to reasonably prevent the crime despite preliminary reports of abuse and 
harassment, the actus reus requirement is satisfied via the omission.197 Simi-
                                                                                                                           
 190 U.S. v. Yamashita, IV L. Rep. of Trials of War Criminals 1, 35 (U.N. War Crimes 
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 191 See Hansen, supra note 11, at 359–60. 
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 197 See MCM, supra note 16, R.C.M. 303; Damaska, supra note 68, at 461–62 (discussing the 
failure to prevent scenario generally); O’Reilly, supra note 19, at 96 (noting that an omission 
satisfies the actus reus requirement where a duty exists); Russell-Brown, supra note 68, at 144. 
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larly, in the second scenario, where the commander fails to reasonably in-
vestigate or punish the subordinate who has already committed rape or sex-
ual assault, the commander has again breached a duty, thereby satisfying the 
actus reus element.198 
2. Negotiating an Acceptable Mens Rea Standard for the Domestic UCMJ 
Setting 
To impose punishment under criminal law, the actor must possess a 
guilty mind, or mens rea.199 As previously discussed, courts have adopted a 
spectrum of mens rea standards for command responsibility, ranging from 
simple negligence to actual knowledge.200 Consequently, courts differ on 
how aware the commander must be of his subordinate’s impending or past 
violation.201 The two most prevalent views suggest that the appropriate 
mens rea for command responsibility is either simple negligence, or height-
ened to recklessness.202 
Under the simple negligence standard, commanders are held liable for 
their subordinates’ crimes even without actual knowledge, so long as they 
had reason to know of the crime’s commission.203 For instance, Article 7(3) 
of the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) holds com-
manders responsible if they “knew or had reason to know that the subordi-
nate was either about to commit the crime or had already done so; and . . . 
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the crime or 
                                                                                                                           
 198 See MCM, supra note 16, R.C.M. 303; Damaska, supra note 68, at 467–68; O’Reilly, 
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exists); Russell-Brown, supra note 68, at 144; Sepinwall, supra note 12, at 299 (arguing that a 
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to punish the subordinate perpetrator after the event.”204 This lesser negli-
gence standard ascribes liability if a commander reasonably should have 
known about his subordinate’s misconduct, and yet failed to prevent or rep-
rimand the subordinate.205 Consequently, the negligence standard induces 
commanders to act with greater consideration when supervising their sub-
ordinates, thereby increasing deterrence of subordinates’ war crimes.206 
In contrast, the reckless or willful blindness standard recognized by the 
International Criminal Court, the Geneva Convention, and other interna-
tional treaties and institutions, establishes a heightened standard of liability, 
requiring proof of wanton, immoral disregard of the subordinate’s ac-
tions.207 The Celebici case succinctly explained that, under a recklessness 
standard, commanders will be held liable if 
the commander had in his possession such information that 
should have put him on notice of the fact that an unlawful act was 
being, or about to be, committed by a subordinate. . . .This is a 
reference to information, which, if at hand, would oblige the 
commander to obtain more information (i.e. conduct further in-
quiry), and he therefore ‘had reason to know.’208 
Thus, the commander must consciously disregard a substantial risk that his 
or her subordinates are committing abuses, to render the commander crimi-
nally liable for failing to take action.209 Although this heightened standard 
requires the commander’s constructive knowledge of the subordinate’s of-
fenses, this knowledge may still be imputed from information indicating a 
need for further investigation, not necessitating actual knowledge of the 
crime itself.210 
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In order to apply command responsibility to the domestic setting, Con-
gress should limit the scope only to serious UCMJ violations, like rape and 
sexual assault.211 This expands the doctrine’s subject matter and jurisdic-
tion, by shifting from deterring war crimes committed abroad, to domestic 
UCMJ violations perpetrated against U.S. service members.212 Critics may 
argue that UCMJ violations, however, pale in comparison to international 
war crimes.213 If the doctrine’s application were limited to serious UCMJ 
violations, such as murder and rape, this concern would be mitigated.214 
After all, the forced rape of a service member in his or her barracks is argu-
ably just as egregious as that of a foreign civilian during an armed con-
flict.215 Similarly, the shift in context from armed conflict abroad to domes-
tic UCMJ violations is justified to ensure the safety of U.S. service mem-
bers, not only while fighting abroad, but also while training at home.216 This 
change safeguards the UCMJ by enforcing its provisions in either setting.217 
This incorporation of command responsibility in the domestic UCMJ 
setting is justified to reduce the commission of serious UCMJ violations, 
like rape and sexual assault, but Congress should counter this expansion by 
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requiring a heightened recklessness mens rea.218 Consequently, commanders 
would be liable for their subordinates’ UCMJ violations only where they 
were aware of a substantial risk that violations did or would occur, and 
failed to reasonably alleviate that risk via further investigation or discipli-
nary action.219 This creates a duty for commanders to prevent, investigate, 
or punish serious violations reported to them, but would not extend to sub-
ordinates’ trivial violations.220 
Accordingly, the commander in SN Cioca’s complaint, as detailed in 
Part I, would be liable under both scenarios of command responsibility: Du-
ty to prevent; and duty to investigate or punish.221 In terms of the duty to 
prevent, he failed to reasonably prevent his subordinate’s later rape of SN 
Cioca after initially denying her preliminary reports of abuse and harass-
ment.222 With regards to the duty to investigate and punish, he failed to send 
the matter to an Article 32 investigation or subsequent courts-martial to de-
termine guilt and appropriate punishment.223 Applying command responsi-
bility to UCMJ violations would address incidents like Cioca’s by forcing 
commanders to treat reported crimes seriously and initiate investigations.224 
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Absent an attentive response to reports of sexual violence, commanders 
would face criminal liability under command responsibility for ignoring a 
substantial risk that subordinates were committing rape and sexual as-
sault.225 
3. Promoting Mode of Liability to Punish Commanders for Their 
Subordinates’ Serious UCMJ Violations 
Where commanders fail to reasonably prevent, investigate, or punish a 
subordinate’s serious UCMJ violation, they should be held criminally liable 
for their subordinates’ principal offenses under a mode of liability theory of 
punishment.226 Even though the commanders do not personally commit the 
crime, they are nonetheless morally culpable for consciously choosing to 
ignore a substantial risk that someone under their command did or soon 
would.227 By ignoring this risk, commanders essentially acquiesce to the 
misbehavior that is very likely occurring under their noses.228 This failure is 
not merely a dereliction of duties punishable as a separate offense, because 
the acquiescence, in turn, creates a command climate accepting of UCMJ 
violations.229 Ultimately, this violation-tolerant command climate generates 
future violations, either by the initial perpetrator, as seen primarily in the 
failure to prevent scenario, or by other subordinates, especially in the failure 
to investigate and punish scenario.230 
Some critics argue that the second scenario—the command climate 
fails to deter other subordinates from committing UCMJ violations—is too 
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attenuated to impose liability on the commander due to insufficiencies in 
personal culpability and causation.231 These scholars argue that reprimand-
ing a commander for a single, isolated failure to investigate or punish is an 
obvious departure from the culpability principle.232 The commander’s dere-
liction of these duties, they assert, does not cause any new wrongdoing, and 
the initial wrongdoing was no fault of the commander’s, but rather that of 
the perpetrator.233 This contention, however, underestimates the role that a 
violation-tolerant command climate has in sanctioning future violations.234 
Furthermore, other scholars note the importance of the expressive inju-
ry that the commander compounds upon the initial crime, by consciously 
choosing not to investigate or punish the subordinate’s offense.235 In other 
words, by acquiescing to the initial offense, a commander becomes a party 
to it because he or she denies the victim the justice and self-dignity that 
punishment is designed to restore.236 This deprivation is an “additional dig-
nitary assault waged by the commander,” making the officer a party, at least 
to some extent, to the underlying crime.237 
By punishing the commander for the subordinate’s underlying crime, 
command responsibility serves both utilitarian and retributive aims.238 First, 
under the utilitarian theory, command responsibility benefits society be-
cause holding commanders criminally liable for failures to prevent, investi-
gate, and punish deters the commission of future crimes, regardless of the 
commander’s own moral culpability in the crime committed.239 Second, 
retributive goals are also met because commanders who fail to effectively 
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command their subordinates are morally blameworthy for consciously ig-
noring a substantial risk that crimes will be or have been committed.240 Fur-
thermore, the commander’s choice to disregard this risk contributes to a 
command climate tolerant of violations and compounds the initial injury by 
inflicting expressive harm upon the victim.241 
Any remaining concerns about weaknesses in causation or personal 
culpability can be addressed by limiting the scope of the doctrine’s incorpo-
ration to serious UCMJ violations only.242 Conversely, minor UCMJ viola-
tions could result in dereliction of duty charges against the commander, 
punishable by administrative reprimands.243 Article 15 of the UCMJ gov-
erns the commander’s power to reprimand subordinates’ minor offenses 
with administrative and non-judicial punishment.244 While Article 15 does 
not define minor offenses, the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) suggests 
that it generally includes an offense punishable by less than one-year con-
finement and not subject to dishonorable discharge.245 The MCM considers 
a number of other factors, including the offender’s age, rank, duty assign-
ment, record and experience, as well as the circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the offense, such as the level of assumed risk or the foresee-
able harm, when determining the seriousness of the offense.246 Thus, disci-
plinary infractions resulting from simple neglect or laziness are best catego-
rized as minor offenses, whereas crimes like rape, murder, and aggravated 
assaults are best categorized as serious offenses.247 In light of Article 15, 
Congress should similarly define serious violations for command responsi-
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bility purposes as those crimes capable of more than one-year confinement 
or dishonorable discharge, which would almost certainly include violent 
crimes like rape and sexual assault.248 
Additionally, Congress can provide for some leeway via sentencing 
guidelines that permit reduced sentences for commanders if mitigating cir-
cumstances are satisfied.249 This slight sentencing discretion effectuates jus-
tice by holding commanders criminally liable for the subordinate’s crime, 
but permitting a reduced (but meaningful) sentence only when they are less 
blameworthy for the underlying atrocity.250 
CONCLUSION 
Incorporating command responsibility within the domestic UCMJ ap-
propriately responds to widespread reports of intra-military rape and sexual 
assault and commanders’ frequent disregard thereof. Absent this recourse, 
commanders often ignore victims’ reports, or even worse, retaliate against 
the victim, leading to a rape-tolerant command climate that condones future 
violence. The DOD recently articulated a duty to prosecute intra-military 
rape and sexual assault, but establishing a duty achieves nothing without 
proper enforcement—command responsibility is one solution. Applying 
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command responsibility to serious violations of the UCMJ would establish 
a clear mandate for the military to prosecute any commander who fails to 
reasonably prevent, investigate, or punish serious UCMJ violations that he 
or she knew about, either via constructive or actual knowledge. Congress 
should limit the doctrine’s scope to serious UCMJ violations that com-
manders are aware of and recklessly choose to ignore in order to focus their 
efforts on preventing significant, rather than trivial harms. 
While this proposal departs from traditional command responsibility, 
which deals solely with international war crimes, it nonetheless achieves the 
customary goal of protecting individuals from brutality. After all, protecting 
our service members from violence should be a priority regardless of the 
setting or the perpetrator’s identity. Intra-military violence also contravenes 
the UCMJ’s goal to achieve justice and impedes mission readiness and ac-
complishment. Moreover, by ignoring the domestic perpetration of sexual 
violence, the military signals its acceptance of rape and sexual assault in 
international warfare, thereby risking the commission of war crimes. 
